Office 39

Office 39, also called Bureau 39 or Central Committee Bureau 39, is a Workers' Party of Korea body described in United States and United Nations records as supporting the DPRK leadership through foreign-currency and revenue activities. These official records establish a direct state nexus. They do not provide a complete, independently verified account of its present leadership, internal structure or income.

Designation and financial network

Executive Order 13551 named Office 39 in its annex in August 2010. Treasury's accompanying fact sheet attributed illicit economic activity, foreign-currency generation and control of domestic and overseas entities to it. The fact sheet also attributed narcotics activity, an attempted luxury-yacht purchase and the use of Banco Delta Asia to Office 39. These are Treasury's stated grounds and assessments, rather than findings by a criminal court (Treasury, 30 August 2010).

In November 2010, Treasury designated Korea Daesong Bank and Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation as owned or controlled by Office 39. Treasury described the bank as facilitating illicit financing and the trading corporation as facilitating foreign transactions for Office 39. This identifies particular institutional relationships; it does not establish that every DPRK bank or trading company belongs to the bureau (Treasury, 18 November 2010).

The Security Council listed Office 39 in Resolution 2270 on 2 March 2016, describing it as a DPRK government entity. The UN consolidated list retrieved on 30 October 2026, generated on 29 October, retained Office 39 as KPe.030. It also retained Korea Daesong Bank as KPe.035 and described that bank as owned and controlled by Office 39. These are sanctions-list records, not transaction-level accounts of revenue or expenditure (Resolution 2270, paragraph 10 and Annex II&l=en&t=pdf); UN consolidated list).

Network boundaries and adaptation

In its October 2025 report, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team identified Kyonghung IT Exchange Company in Dandong as a delegation working for Office 39. It described Kyonghung IT as a subsidiary of an Office 39-affiliated trading bureau, with revenue remitted to that parent. The report attributed these findings to participating-state information; it did not publish the underlying intelligence in full. This is a specific reported relationship, not proof that Office 39 commands all DPRK cyber or overseas-worker activity (MSMT, 2025, pp. 21, 57, 59).

Statecraft relevance and limits

The documented role is enabling access and revenue for the leadership. Designation and restrictions on financial intermediaries seek to deny that access, while the reported use of trading and service networks illustrates adaptation. This analytical classification does not establish successful coercion of another state or quantify the bureau's contribution to any weapons programme.

A company relationship, a sanctions listing and a particular financial transaction require separate evidence. The dated records support identified links and official assessments, not a comprehensive organisation chart. Current revenue totals, personal direction by Kim Jong-un and responsibility for a specific transaction should not be inferred from Office 39's general function. The Banco Delta Asia Section 311 action (2005-2007) and Currency counterfeiting as economic weapon remain related subjects, not substitutes for evidence about a particular Office 39 operation.

See also

North Korea · Kim Jong-un · Currency counterfeiting as economic weapon · Banco Delta Asia Section 311 action (2005-2007)

Sources

• United States Department of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: New Executive Order Targeting Proliferation and Other Illicit Activities Related to North Korea (30 August 2010).
• United States Department of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Key Nodes of the Illicit Financing Network of North Korea's Office 39 (18 November 2010).
• Office of Foreign Assets Control, North Korea Executive Order / North Korea Designations / Non-proliferation Designations (30 August 2010).
• United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2270 (2016)&l=en&t=pdf), paragraph 10 and Annex II, item 10 (2 March 2016).
• United Nations Security Council, Consolidated list, KPe.030 and KPe.035, generated 29 October 2026, accessed 30 October 2026.
• Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, The DPRK's Violation and Evasion of UN Sanctions through Cyber and Information Technology Worker Activities, MSMT/2025/2 (22 October 2025), pp. 21, 57, 59; official copy published by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.