COSCO

COSCO here denotes China COSCO SHIPPING Corporation Limited and its group of distinct corporate entities. Chinese state ownership connects the group, but does not make every affiliate the same legal person. COSCO SHIPPING Ports' 2026 interim financial statements identify COSCO SHIPPING Holdings as its controlling shareholder and China COSCO SHIPPING Corporation Limited as the ultimate parent controlled by the Chinese government. These relationships must be distinguished when analysing investment, commercial operations or sanctions (interim report, notes 1 and 18).

Network position

As at 30 June 2026, COSCO SHIPPING Ports reported operating and managing 394 berths at 40 ports, including 245 container berths. These are company-reported facilities, not cargo throughput. The same report describes a strategy of strengthening key port hubs and connecting shipping and logistics services. It records COSCO SHIPPING Holdings' ownership of 72.65 per cent of the ports company at that date. This establishes a specific corporate relationship; it does not demonstrate government direction of each commercial decision.

Piraeus requires a separate entity boundary. Piraeus Port Authority's 2025 annual financial report records COSCO SHIPPING (Hong Kong) Co., Limited as its 67 per cent shareholder at 31 December 2025; the company's shareholder page continued to show that interest when checked on 31 October 2026. The report describes PPA's concession from the Greek State as the right to use and exploit land, buildings and facilities in the port zone until 13 February 2052. Its stated obligations include continuing port services, maintaining security and treating port users fairly. Those reported commercial rights and obligations do not establish a transfer of Greek sovereignty or demonstrate Chinese control of customs or naval access (annual report, pp. 66-67, 394-395 and 402).

Sanctions and exact entities

The State Department's record of its 25 September 2019 action distinguishes two Dalian companies. It determined that COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Seaman & Ship Management Co., Ltd. knowingly engaged in a significant transaction involving Iranian petroleum or petroleum products. It separately determined that COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Co., Ltd. owned or controlled that company and knew of its conduct. The selected sanctions included blocking. These are attributed administrative determinations, not findings that every COSCO affiliate transported Iranian petroleum (State Department notice).

OFAC's 31 January 2020 notice deleted the tanker company and Yazhou Xu from the SDN List. It did not delete the Seaman and Ship Management company. That company's SDN record remained present when checked on 31 October 2026, under programme IRAN-EO13846. OFAC FAQ 804 explains that the blocking action also reaches entities owned 50 per cent or more by blocked persons, while other COSCO affiliates are not blocked solely by association. The FAQ preserves restrictions on dealings involving blocked persons or other prohibited activities. Neither the deletion nor this explanation provides general clearance for transactions with the group.

The Department of Defense's 10 June 2026 Section 1260H notice separately listed China COSCO SHIPPING Corporation Limited and four subsidiaries: China Ocean Shipping Company Ltd., COSCO SHIPPING (North America) Inc., COSCO SHIPPING Logistics Supply Chain Co., Ltd. and Shanghai Ship and Shipping Research. It removed COSCO SHIPPING Finance Co., Ltd. from the previous list. The notice records the department's military-company determinations; it is not the OFAC blocking action. Removing the finance company from that list did not remove the parent or the other four named subsidiaries.

COSCO therefore illustrates two distinct statecraft questions: how state ownership intersects with commercial infrastructure, and how restrictions differentiate entities inside a group. Corporate disclosures establish reported ownership and operations; the cited sanctions records establish specified actions and their stated scope. Neither alone measures coercive influence, freight-market effects or the strategic purpose of an individual port decision.

See also

Maritime chokepoint interdiction | Port terminal operating systems and foreign operator control | Third-country intermediary routing | China

Sources

• COSCO SHIPPING Ports Limited, Interim Report 2026, reporting to 30 June 2026, introductory profile, pp. 13-14, 34 and 50, approved 28 August 2026.
• COSCO SHIPPING Ports Limited, Sustainability Report 2016, scope of report, recording the parent's establishment in February 2016.
• Piraeus Port Authority S.A., Annual Financial Report for the year ended December 31, 2025, pp. 66-67, 394-395 and 402.
• Piraeus Port Authority S.A., "Company Profile", shareholder information accessed 31 October 2026.
• United States Department of State, "Notice of Department of State Sanctions Actions Pursuant to Executive Order 13846 of August 6, 2018, Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect to Iran", 85 FR 81261, 15 December 2020; actions effective 25 September 2019 and 31 January 2020.
• Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Iran-related Designations Removals and Designation Update; Non-proliferation Designation Update", 31 January 2020; "Frequently Asked Question 804", released 31 January 2020.
• Office of Foreign Assets Control, "COSCO SHIPPING TANKER (DALIAN) SEAMAN AND SHIP MANAGEMENT CO., LTD.", SDN record 27465, accessed 31 October 2026; displayed SDN update 28 October 2026.
• United States Department of Defense, "Notice of Availability of Designation of Chinese Military Companies", 91 FR 35189, 10 June 2026, pp. 35191 and 35194.