Taliban

The Taliban is an Afghan movement and the de facto governing authority in Afghanistan since August 2021. It must be distinguished from Afghanistan as a state, Da Afghanistan Bank, persons and entities listed under United Nations sanctions, and the Fund for the Afghan People. Those subjects have different rights, property and legal status. The Secretary-General's September 2026 report continues to describe the Taliban's administration as the de facto authorities.

Sanctions and reserves

Security Council Resolution 1267 of 1999&l=en&t=pdf) imposed measures on the first Taliban regime. The sanctions architecture later divided, with the 1988 regime&l=en&t=pdf) addressing listed individuals and entities associated with the Taliban. It is not a blanket asset freeze on every Afghan person or transaction.

At the Taliban takeover in August 2021, approximately USD 7 billion of Da Afghanistan Bank funds were on deposit at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and other United States banks, according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction's written congressional evidence, page 68. Executive Order 14064 of 11 February 2022 blocked specified property and provided for licensed dealings intended to benefit Afghanistan's people. The order did not finally award half the property to September 11 litigants. Attachment litigation, licences, transfers and court decisions are separate legal steps.

In September 2022, USD 3.5 billion moved to the Swiss-based Fund for the Afghan People, as documented in the same congressional evidence and the Treasury's founding announcement. The Fund reported assets exceeding USD 3.9 billion as at December 2024. That is a dated balance, not a current 2026 figure. The Fund states that its purpose is to protect and preserve assets for the Afghan people without making them available to the Taliban.

Security Council Resolution 2615&l=en&t=pdf) created a humanitarian exception to the asset freeze in the 1988 sanctions regime. It did not suspend all restrictions affecting Afghanistan. In an August 2023 analysis, the World Bank described continuing banking difficulties and risk avoidance despite humanitarian exceptions. That is evidence of the banking conditions described at that date, not a finding about every bank's current decisions.

Adaptation and recognition

The de facto authorities raise customs and tax revenue. The Secretary-General's September 2026 report, paragraphs 30-31, describes pressure on customs revenue and new tax concessions. The World Bank's August 2023 analysis describes the wider Afghan economy's reliance on hawala; this does not by itself establish that a particular authority used an informal settlement channel. The Secretary-General's September 2026 report, paragraph 48, states that UNODC's 2026 findings show opium poppy cultivation and production remaining at historically low levels since the 2022 ban, while seizure data indicate increasing methamphetamine trafficking originating in or transiting through the region, particularly Afghanistan. These are dated findings with distinct measures, not proof that all illicit drug activity has ended.

On 3 July 2025, Russia formally recognised the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Russian Foreign Ministry's statement that day records that Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko received copies of the Afghan ambassador's credentials. This was a bilateral recognition decision. The Secretary-General continued to use the term 'de facto authorities' in the September 2026 report; that reporting terminology is separate from Russia's recognition.

See also

Afghanistan central bank reserve freeze (2021-present) | Da Afghanistan Bank | Fund for the Afghan People | Hawala and informal value transfer | UNSCR 1267 (1999)

Sources

1. United Nations Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/81/363-S/2026/724, 9 September 2026, especially paragraphs 30-31 and 48.
2. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1267&l=en&t=pdf), S/RES/1267 (1999), 15 October 1999, especially paragraphs 3-4.
3. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1988&l=en&t=pdf), S/RES/1988 (2011), 17 June 2011, especially paragraphs 1 and 30; 1988 Sanctions Committee, substantive committee account retrieved 17 October 2026.
4. United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Examining the Biden Administration's Afghanistan Policy Since the U.S. Withdrawal, hearing of 14 November 2023, Serial 118-60, published 2024, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction's response to question 5, printed pages 68-69.
5. President of the United States, Executive Order 14064, Protecting Certain Property of Da Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the People of Afghanistan, 11 February 2022, Federal Register 87, 8391-8393, 15 February 2022.
6. United States Department of the Treasury, The United States and Partners Establish Fund for the People of Afghanistan, 14 September 2022.
7. Fund for the Afghan People, official governance and financial information, checked 18 October 2026; the balance cited is explicitly as at December 2024.
8. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2615&l=en&t=pdf), S/RES/2615 (2021), 22 December 2021, paragraph 1.
9. Namoos Zaheer, Rethinking payments in Afghanistan, World Bank, 4 August 2023.
10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, On the presentation of copies of credentials by the Ambassador of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to the Russian Federation, G. H. Hassan, 3 July 2025, official statement 1148-03-07-2025, Russian-language full text; title translated.