Edition 2.0.38 / Archived entry
UNSCR 1267 (1999)
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) created a Chapter VII sanctions regime against the Taliban in response to its sheltering of Osama bin Laden. Adopted on 15 October 1999, it required specified aviation restrictions and a freeze of designated Taliban funds from 14 November 1999 unless the Council had first determined that the Taliban had complied with the demand to surrender bin Laden. Later resolutions transformed the regime into the current global list-based system against ISIL and Al-Qaida. Resolution 1267, paragraphs 2 to 4); committee history.
Evolution
Resolution 1333 (2000) extended the asset freeze to bin Laden, associated individuals and entities, including Al-Qaida. Resolution 1390 (2002) applied the asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo to listed persons and entities without tying them to Taliban-controlled territory. Resolutions 1988 and 1989 (2011) split the Taliban regime from the Al-Qaida regime. Resolution 2253 (2015) expressly incorporated ISIL into the latter's name and criteria. Resolution 1333, paragraph 8(c)); Resolution 1390, paragraphs 1 and 2); Resolution 1988, paragraphs 1 and 2); Resolution 1989, paragraphs 1 and 2); Resolution 2253, paragraphs 1 to 3).
The current regime must therefore be read through the later resolutions and committee procedures, rather than the unamended 1999 text. Listing criteria, narrative summaries, delisting procedures and exemptions need to be distinguished from the national measures implementing the obligations. Resolution 2734); committee guidelines, amended 6 August 2024.
Procedure and review
The Security Council committee maintains the ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions List. Member States propose listings and the committee acts under its consensus procedures. States must implement the applicable asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo, subject to their stated exceptions. Resolution 2734, paragraphs 1 and 56 to 65); committee guidelines, sections 4 to 6.
Earlier implementation produced serious procedural challenges. In Kadi v Council and Commission (ECJ, 2008), the Court held that the appellants' rights of defence and effective judicial protection had not been respected in the EU implementing regulation. Its judgment concerned that regulation, not the annulment of a Security Council resolution. The Council created the Office of the Ombudsperson through Resolution 1904 (2009); later resolutions strengthened the delisting process. Kadi judgment, paragraphs 286 to 299 and 333 to 353; Resolution 1904, paragraphs 20 and 21); Resolution 2734, paragraphs 66 to 70).
As at 20 October 2026, the Ombudsperson's mandate under Resolution 2734 runs until 17 June 2027. The Office receives delisting requests for the ISIL and Al-Qaida list. Where it recommends delisting, the measures terminate 60 days after the committee completes consideration of its comprehensive report, unless the committee decides by consensus to retain them or the question is referred to the Security Council under the prescribed procedure. During a referral, the measures remain in force for the specified period until the Council decides the question. This mechanism does not cover every UN sanctions list. Resolution 2734, paragraphs 66 to 70); current Ombudsperson mandate.
Humanitarian position and assessment
Resolution 2664 (2022) permits specified humanitarian and basic-needs activities by the providers covered by its paragraph 1 without violating UN asset freezes. Its application to the ISIL and Al-Qaida regime was initially limited to two years, then continued by Resolution 2761 (2024). This is a defined exemption, not a general removal of the listing or the travel and arms measures. Providers are requested to use reasonable efforts to minimise prohibited benefits reaching designated parties. Resolution 2664, paragraphs 1 to 4); Resolution 2761, paragraphs 1 and 4).
The regime's design links a globally binding asset freeze to national implementation and financial screening. Resolution 2734 addresses identifiers, implementation gaps, exemptions and review. Those provisions identify practical conditions for the system to function; they do not establish a quantified disruption effect. Listing numbers alone do not measure disruption or due-process quality. Resolution 2734, paragraphs 20, 43 to 65 and 87 to 95).
Reporting discipline
A current account should state whether it concerns the original Taliban measure, the separate 1988 Taliban regime or the 1267, 1989 and 2253 ISIL and Al-Qaida regime. The shorthand "1267 list" can obscure that split. A separate national designation should be identified by its own authority rather than treated as equivalent to the committee's listing. Resolutions 1988) and 1989); committee history.
The committee's narrative summary records the reasons advanced for listing. The regime is preventive and does not require a criminal charge or conviction. A delisting recommendation or decision changes sanctions status under the relevant procedure; it should not be represented as an adjudication of every historical allegation. This distinction is essential when writing about named living persons. Resolution 2734, paragraphs 61 and 70); committee guidelines, sections 6(d), 7 and 9.
See also
UN 1267 (ISIL and Al-Qaida) Sanctions Committee · UN 1267 Ombudsperson (2009) · Kadi v Council and Commission (ECJ, 2008) · UNSCR 2664 (2022) · Smart (targeted) sanctions
Sources
- United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1267 (1999)), 15 October 1999.
- United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1333 (2000)), 19 December 2000.
- United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1390 (2002)), adopted 16 January 2002; retained copy reissued for technical reasons on 28 January 2002.
- United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1988 (2011)) and Resolution 1989 (2011)), 17 June 2011.
- United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2253 (2015)), 17 December 2015.
- Court of Justice of the European Communities, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, judgment of 3 September 2008.
- United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1904 (2009)), 17 December 2009.
- United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2734 (2024)), 10 June 2024.
- United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2664 (2022)), 9 December 2022.
- United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2761 (2024)), 6 December 2024.
- ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work, amended 6 August 2024, sections 4 to 7 and 9.
- United Nations Security Council, ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, checked 20 October 2026.
- United Nations Security Council, Office of the Ombudsperson, checked 20 October 2026.
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