Institution

BRICS

BRICS is an intergovernmental forum for political, security, economic, financial and people-to-people cooperation. It coordinates member positions through a rotating annual chair and consensus. Its strategic importance lies in collective agenda setting, development finance and efforts to increase emerging economies' influence within international institutions. India's 2026 chair backgrounder describes the annual presidency; the New Delhi Declaration, paragraph 2, states the cooperation framework.

Institutional development

Brazil, Russia, India and China began ministerial coordination under the BRIC label in 2006, and leaders held their first summit in 2009. South Africa's inclusion was agreed in 2010 and it attended the 2011 Sanya summit. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates became full members in January 2024; Indonesia joined in January 2025. These stages are recorded in India's *Brief on BRICS*, February 2025, paragraphs 3 and 4.

The Indian chair's 10 September 2026 backgrounder lists eleven members: Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates. This dated account follows the chair's express membership classification, rather than inferring membership from invitations or attendance. It distinguishes ten partner countries from full members. That classification does not by itself establish a precise accession date for Saudi Arabia.

The 2014 Fortaleza summit produced two distinct treaty frameworks. The New Development Bank finances infrastructure and sustainable development; its Articles of Agreement, article 29, grant it international and juridical personality. The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement provides a framework for central-bank liquidity support; its original treaty, article 19, expressly denies it independent international legal personality. Neither framework's acts should be attributed automatically to the wider forum.

Participation also differs. The NDB's member register, checked on 4 November 2026, includes Bangladesh, Algeria and Uzbekistan, which are absent from the chair's BRICS full-member list. For the CRA, paragraph 97 of the New Delhi Declaration still describes discussions on voluntary onboarding of interested new BRICS members. It establishes neither completed accessions nor an amended treaty's effective date.

Economic statecraft

The New Delhi Declaration of 12 September 2026, paragraphs 17 to 22, calls for reform of international economic governance and opposes unilateral coercive measures that it describes as contrary to international law. Paragraph 18 also supports an adequately resourced IMF at the centre of the financial safety net. The declared agenda combines reform within existing institutions with selective additional mechanisms.

The same declaration, paragraphs 90, 93 and 94, records payment-interoperability studies, local-currency discussions, technical work on a New Investment Platform and dialogue on settlement and depositary infrastructure. These passages do not establish an operational common currency or a unified BRICS payment network. A political declaration, a technical study and an implemented connection are different levels of commitment and capability.

Development lending provides a more concrete measure. The NDB's *Annual Report 2025*, “NDB in Numbers”, records USD 3,171 million of financing approved for 19 projects during 2025. Those are bank approvals, not disbursements or spending by a BRICS common treasury. The CRA's original treaty instead provides reciprocal reserve commitments: article 2 leaves ownership and possession with each participant until an approved swap takes place.

Assessment

BRICS combines collective diplomatic reach with implementation through distinct institutions and national authorities. Consensus preserves member control while making shared positions dependent on agreement among diverse governments. Development lending, reserve commitments and payment cooperation should therefore be assessed separately. Institutional capacity can accumulate without a single monetary strategy or uniform geopolitical alignment.

Assessment should track adoption, funding, participation and completed transactions. The distinctions in the NDB's report, the CRA treaty and the summit declaration prevent proposals from being inflated into functioning alternatives. BRICS matters as a forum through which states bargain over international rules and develop selective options; its effect depends on which instruments are adopted and used.

See also

New Development Bank (BRICS) · BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement · BRICS Pay and BRICS payment initiatives · De-dollarisation as backlash dynamic · Network reconstitution (parallel rails)

Sources

  1. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Brief on BRICS*, February 2025, paragraphs 3 to 5.
  2. Government of India, Press Information Bureau, “BRICS: Evolution, Cooperation and India's Leadership”, 10 September 2026, membership and presidency sections.
  3. BRICS leaders, “BRICS New Delhi Declaration: Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”, published by the Prime Minister of India, 12 September 2026, paragraphs 2, 17 to 22, 90, 93, 94 and 97.
  4. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, *Agreement on the New Development Bank* and annexed Articles of Agreement, Fortaleza, 15 July 2014, agreement articles 1 to 3 and annex article 29.
  5. Brazil, Decree No. 8,702 of 1 April 2016 and annexed *Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement*, treaty signed 15 July 2014, articles 1 to 3, 6 to 9 and 19.
  6. New Development Bank, “Members”, accessed 4 November 2026.
  7. New Development Bank, *Annual Report 2025*, overview, “NDB in Numbers”, year ended 31 December 2025.

Recommended citation

Cite this entry

Tennant, James J., ed. 'BRICS.' The Encyclopedia of Economic Statecraft, version 2.0.1, last reviewed 4 November 2026. https://statecraftencyclopedia.org/entries/brics/.

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