Afghanistan central bank reserve freeze (2021-present)

Da Afghanistan Bank lost access to foreign reserves after the Taliban takeover on 15 August 2021. The Second Circuit later recorded that the United States Treasury blocked DAB's Federal Reserve Bank of New York assets on that date; Treasury also described uncertainty over who could authorise transactions on DAB's accounts worldwide. The United States subsequently blocked United States-held property under Executive Order 14064 and transferred USD 3.5 billion to the Swiss-based Fund for the Afghan People. Sovereign ownership, custody, execution immunity, conditional access and humanitarian consequence are separate questions.

Loss of access and policy sequence

The Second Circuit's 26 August 2025 opinion, pages 11-15, describes approximately USD 7 billion held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and identifies 15 August 2021 as the blocking date. Treasury's September 2022 account separately explains that DAB lost access to accounts in several countries because of uncertainty over who could authorise transactions. These records distinguish a documented United States blocking action from the wider custody and authority problem; they do not establish that all custodians followed one coordinated compellence strategy.

A further United States legal step followed on 11 February 2022. Executive Order 14064 blocked specified DAB property held in the United States and directed steps to protect part of it for the Afghan people. The order did not itself make the Taliban the owner of DAB's assets or transfer the entire approximately USD 7 billion to one destination.

The United States and partners announced the Afghan Fund on 14 September 2022. USD 3.5 billion was transferred for custody in an account at the Bank for International Settlements under a Swiss foundation structure. The Fund's statement dated 19 August 2026, reporting its 16 June board meeting, states that financial assets totalled USD 4.11 billion at 31 December 2025, compared with USD 3.94 billion a year earlier. Original principal, investment value and valuation date must remain distinct.

The 19 August 2026 statement records approval of the audited 2025 financial statements and of the Disbursement Policy and Conflict of Interest Policy. Approval of a disbursement policy does not establish that a disbursement occurred. In its September 2022 founding account, Treasury stated conditions for supporting return to DAB, including central-bank independence, adequate anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing controls, a third-party needs assessment and a monitor. These are institutional access conditions, not proof of a general demand that the Taliban change every unrelated policy. The Fund's public account and August statement, checked on 19 October 2026, do not provide a complete current disbursement history. This entry therefore does not infer that no payment has occurred or that all intended benefits have been realised.

Litigation and execution immunity

The other United States-held DAB assets became subject to litigation by creditors seeking attachment or turnover. They were not allocated to September 11 claimants merely because claims were filed. On 26 August 2025, the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of both forms of relief on distinct grounds. It held DAB immune from prejudgment attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. For the judgment creditors, it held that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act could abrogate immunity, but that DAB was not an agency or instrumentality of the Taliban at the relevant blocking date, so a statutory prerequisite for turnover was not met. The court denied rehearing en banc on 19 March 2026 and denied panel rehearing in an amended order dated 3 April 2026. The Supreme Court docket for Havlish v Taliban, No. 26-292, checked on 19 October 2026, records a certiorari petition filed on 31 August and amicus briefs filed on 5 October. It records no disposition of the petition at that check. The petition is not a grant of review or a reversal.

Execution immunity does not decide recognition of the Taliban, operational access by DAB, the Fund's governance or the final disposition of every reserve asset. Those legal and policy questions must not be collapsed into confiscation, donation or return.

Sanctions, central-bank functions and humanitarian conditions

OFAC's General Licence 20, dated 25 February 2022 and still linked from its programme page at the 19 October 2026 check, authorises specified transactions involving Afghanistan or its governing institutions under the named counter-terrorism authorities, subject to its exceptions. Paragraph (b) excludes specified financial transfers, luxury items and debits to blocked United States accounts; note 2 expressly leaves EO 14064-blocked DAB property unaffected. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2615&l=en&t=pdf), paragraph 1, creates a humanitarian and basic-needs exception to the specified UN asset freeze. It neither releases the United States-held reserves nor adjudicates their ownership.

Reserve restrictions must be assessed alongside the wider disruption of banking and assistance. The World Bank's August 2023 payments analysis describes impaired banking, limited international connectivity and reliance on informal channels. Its May 2026 Economic Monitor, highlights, reports modest growth alongside declining per-capita incomes. The Secretary-General's September 2026 report, summary and paragraphs 29-47, records population returns, funding shortages, regional disruption and restrictions on women affecting humanitarian conditions. These dated accounts describe several interacting pressures; they do not identify the reserve restriction as the sole cause of the crisis.

Assessment

The documented arrangements restrict access to the reserves and the Fund's dated accounts show preservation of nominal assets. Asset preservation is a narrower outcome than demonstrated macroeconomic stabilisation or social benefit. The cited record does not establish successful regime compellence, and the absence of a complete current disbursement record cannot be treated as proof that no benefit has occurred.

This case concerns financial denial, institutional recognition and conditional access during a change of governing authority. Direct United States blocking is documented from August 2021. Its humanitarian assessment must remain multi-causal, distinguish state assets from the de facto authority and keep legal control, financial preservation and social outcomes separate.

See also

Central-bank reserve immobilisation · Da Afghanistan Bank · Humanitarian cost of sanctions · Central-bank reserve immobilisation and confiscation · United States freeze of Iranian government assets during the hostage crisis (1979-1981) · Coalition immobilisation of Central Bank of Russia reserves (2022-present) · Over-compliance (de-risking) · Financial warfare

Sources

1. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Havlish v Taliban; Aliganga v Taliban, panel opinion, 26 August 2025, especially pages 6-15 and 34-43.
2. President of the United States, Executive Order 14064, Protecting Certain Property of Da Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the People of Afghanistan, 11 February 2022, Federal Register 87, 8391-8393, 15 February 2022.
3. United States Departments of the Treasury and State, The United States and Partners Announce Establishment of Fund for the People of Afghanistan, 14 September 2022.
4. Fund for the Afghan People, Statement on the tenth Board meeting of 16 June 2026, 19 August 2026, including the summary of decisions; official public account, checked 19 October 2026.
5. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Order denying rehearing en banc, 19 March 2026, retained as Exhibit 2 in Supreme Court application 25A1393.
6. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Amended order denying panel rehearing, 3 April 2026, retained as Exhibit 3 in Supreme Court application 25A1393.
7. Supreme Court of the United States, Havlish v Taliban, No. 26-292, public docket, checked 19 October 2026.
8. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Afghanistan-related General License 20, Authorizing Transactions Involving Afghanistan or Governing Institutions in Afghanistan, 25 February 2022, paragraphs (a)-(b) and note 2; programme index, checked 19 October 2026.
9. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2615&l=en&t=pdf), S/RES/2615 (2021), 22 December 2021, paragraph 1.
10. Namoos Zaheer, Rethinking payments in Afghanistan, World Bank, 4 August 2023.
11. World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, May 2026, highlights and data notes.
12. United Nations Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/81/363-S/2026/724, 9 September 2026, summary and paragraphs 29-47.