Edition 2.0.46 / Archived entry

Symington and Glenn Amendments (US, 1976 and 1977)

The Symington and Glenn provisions restrict assistance, transfers and financial access following specified nuclear-proliferation conduct. Section 305 of Public Law 94-329, enacted on 30 June 1976, added the original nuclear-transfer rule. Section 12 of Public Law 95-92, enacted on 4 August 1977, separated enrichment from reprocessing and detonation provisions. The amended authorities were recast in 1994 as Arms Export Control Act sections 101 and 102, now 22 USC 2799aa and 2799aa-1. Public Law 94-329, section 305; Public Law 95-92, section 12; 22 USC 2799aa, source and recodification notes.

Enrichment restrictions

The Symington rule, section 2799aa(a), restricts specified economic and military assistance, training, peacekeeping assistance, military credits and guarantees funded under the Foreign Assistance Act or Arms Export Control Act. It applies after a presidential determination concerning delivery or receipt of enrichment equipment, materials or technology on or after 4 August 1977. The pre-delivery exception requires both agreement on multilateral management when available and an IAEA agreement covering the transferred items and all nuclear fuel and facilities in the recipient country. 22 USC 2799aa(a).

Assistance may continue under section 2799aa(b) if the President certifies that termination would seriously harm vital US interests and that reliable assurances have been received against acquiring or developing nuclear weapons or helping others to do so. Reasons must accompany the certification. It takes effect on congressional receipt, but a disapproving joint resolution enacted within 30 calendar days ends its effect and immediately suspends deliveries under it. 22 USC 2799aa(b).

Reprocessing, devices and sanctions

The Glenn provision has separate routes. Section 2799aa-1(a) addresses reprocessing transfers on or after 4 August 1977, subject to a narrow exception for US-participating international evaluations of alternatives to pure-plutonium reprocessing. It also covers a non-nuclear-weapon state's illegal export or attempted export from the United States on or after 8 August 1985 of items significantly contributing to its nuclear-device manufacturing ability, where the President finds the intended manufacturing use. The statute attributes specified agents' conduct to the country. 22 USC 2799aa-1(a)(1).

For that subsection, the President may certify during the fiscal year that terminating assistance would seriously prejudice US non-proliferation objectives or jeopardise common defence and security, giving specific reasons. The certification becomes effective on receipt by Congress and is subject to the 30-calendar-day enacted-disapproval route. This differs from both Symington's assurance test and the device-related procedures below. 22 USC 2799aa-1(a)(2) and (3).

Subsection (b) separately addresses post-effective-date transfers of a nuclear explosive device to a non-nuclear-weapon state, such a state's receipt or detonation, and qualifying transfers or sought-and-received design information or components. The design and component tests include importance and intended-use findings, with knowledge required of the transferring country. The President must report the determination and impose the specified sanctions, subject to the distinct relief procedures. The effective date was 60 days after 30 April 1994. The term non-nuclear-weapon state follows the NPT classification incorporated in subsection (c). 22 USC 2799aa-1(b)(1) and effective-date note.

The subsection (b) sanctions include ending covered foreign assistance, defence sales and export licences, and foreign military financing; denying US government credit or financial assistance; opposing lending or assistance by international financial institutions; and barring US-bank credit to the target government. These categories have different humanitarian, agricultural, medical or intelligence exceptions. US opposition does not itself establish that an international institution refused a loan, and the bank-credit provision concerns the government rather than every private borrower. 22 USC 2799aa-1(b)(2)(A) to (F).

Paragraph (b)(2)(G) also directs use of export-control authority, but still refers to former 50 USC 4605. The official editorial note records that provision's repeal in 2018. This entry therefore does not infer a present export-licensing rule from that cross-reference alone; a current transaction requires its operative export-control authority and rules. 22 USC 2799aa-1(b)(2)(G) and References in Text.

Distinct relief procedures

For device transfers, receipt or detonation under (b)(1)(A) and (B), a national-security certification can delay sanctions for no more than 30 days of continuous congressional session. Only one such certification is permitted for the same event. The ordinary waiver route then requires an enacted authorising joint resolution and a further presidential certification concerning non-proliferation objectives or common defence and security. This is more demanding than a unilateral general waiver. 22 USC 2799aa-1(b)(4) and (5).

For design-information or component cases under (b)(1)(C) and (D), sanctions begin 30 days after the report unless legislation prevents them to the relevant extent. A separate presidential certification that application would seriously harm vital US interests can disapply them. Subsection (b) determinations cannot be delegated. These procedural differences make the precise trigger essential to any account of application. 22 USC 2799aa-1(b)(6) and (8).

Historical application and limits

The Sanctions following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests (1998-2001) demonstrate the need to distinguish imposition from relief. The Code records determinations for India on 13 May 1998 and Pakistan on 30 May. Presidential Determination 2001-28, signed on 22 September 2001, used the separate India-Pakistan authority in section 9001 of Public Law 106-79 to waive specified nuclear sanctions to the extent not already waived. Section 9001 retains a later-trigger termination condition. Neither the 1998 decisions nor the 2001 waiver alone establishes present transaction eligibility. 22 USC 2799aa-1, executive documents and section 9001 note; Determination 2001-28, Federal Register 66(191), 2 October 2001, p. 50095.

These authorities differ from the Pakistan-specific certification rule in the Pressler Amendment (US, 1985). In this encyclopedia's analytical terms they combine Foreign aid conditionality and resource denial within Economic statecraft. Legal restrictions do not establish a resulting change in nuclear policy. This account was checked on 17 November 2026 against official Code texts current through Public Law 119-142 of 10 November; later laws, programme appropriations and transaction-specific permissions require separate checks. 22 USC 2375(e); Office of the Law Revision Counsel, Currency and Updating.

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