Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is an intergovernmental organisation founded in 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. India and Pakistan joined in 2017, Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024. The SCO membership page, checked on 29 October 2026, lists ten members; the October 2026 heads-of-government communique names delegations from the same ten states.

The SCO Charter sets broad objectives covering regional security, political coordination and cooperation in trade, investment, transport, energy and other fields. Decisions are made by agreement without voting, which protects sovereignty but limits central enforcement. The original Charter identifies the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure as a permanent body. Economic work is conducted through ministerial meetings, programmes, business forums and proposed financing mechanisms rather than a common market or supranational treasury.

The SCO matters to economic statecraft as a platform for Eurasian alignment and agenda-setting. Its declarations support connectivity, settlement cooperation and members' development initiatives. The 2024 Astana Declaration, for example, endorsed expanded economic cooperation while recording differences among members on particular initiatives. The organisation does not operate a common sanctions regime, and membership should not be treated as proof that it coordinates sanctions evasion. Several members are subject to extensive Western sanctions, but that is a fact about member states, not an institutional finding about the SCO.

The Bishkek Declaration of 1 September 2026 reports approval of regulations for a Universal Centre for Countering Security Challenges and Threats and an Anti-Drug Centre executive committee. The Secretariat also reports signature of a Charter amendment protocol. Approval and signature do not establish when each body becomes operational or the protocol enters into force.

The communique from the Dushanbe meeting of 19 and 20 October 2026, published on 26 October, records continuing work towards an SCO Development Bank among interested members and greater use of national currencies in their settlements. It does not establish that the bank is operating, funded or used to evade sanctions. Both English documents are Secretariat-hosted unofficial translations.

Its strategic value therefore lies more in convening and political signalling than in binding economic integration. It gives China and Russia a durable forum outside Western-led institutions, while Central and South Asian members use it to diversify relationships. Consensus rules and divergent interests constrain collective action.

Institutional claims should therefore be tied to adopted documents or implemented programmes. A summit declaration records member positions but does not prove financing, regulatory alignment or completed infrastructure. That boundary is essential when assessing whether the SCO is building a parallel economic order.

See also

China · Russia · Belt and Road Initiative · Regional economic integration · Order-building

Sources

1. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (7 June 2002), full-text reproduction in the GRIPS and University of Tokyo World and Japan database, Articles 1, 3, 4, 10, 16, 17, 21 and 23.
2. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, general information.
3. SCO, Belarus accession and Heads of State Council meeting, 4 July 2024.
4. SCO, Astana Declaration, 4 July 2024.
5. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Bishkek Declaration of the 25th Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (1 September 2026), pp. 9 and 12 to 13, unofficial English translation.
6. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Joint Communique following the 25th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (meeting 19 and 20 October 2026; published 26 October 2026), pp. 1, 5 and 12, unofficial English translation.
7. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Secretariat, Briefing on the outcomes of the Bishkek Summit (11 September 2026).