Edition 2.0.38 / Archived entry

Court of Justice of the European Union

The Court of Justice of the European Union is the European Union judicial institution comprising the Court of Justice and the General Court. It reviews European Union restrictive measures within treaty jurisdiction. It does not adopt sanctions, perform Commission administration or replace national enforcement authorities.

Institutional and procedural boundary

Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union defines the judicial institution and its component courts. A challenge must identify the court and procedural route. The General Court ordinarily hears direct annulment actions at first instance, while the Court of Justice hears appeals on points of law. Since 1 October 2024, the General Court also determines preliminary references falling exclusively within six specified fields, including customs and tariff classification. References are still submitted to the Court of Justice, which checks whether to transfer them; it retains references raising independent questions of primary law, public international law, general principles or the Charter (Article 256 TFEU; Regulation 2024/2019, Articles 1(4) and 2). CJEU, Court of Justice and General Court are therefore not interchangeable labels for a case.

Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for review of the legality of European Union acts. Annulment, appeal, damages, preliminary ruling and interim relief have different tests and consequences. An annulled listing may also be replaced by a new act supported by different reasons and evidence. Separate international and national measures retain their own legal positions.

Common Foreign and Security Policy jurisdiction is treaty-specific. Article 275 limits jurisdiction while preserving stated exceptions, including review of certain restrictive measures against natural or legal persons. Later case law must also be considered. In KS and KD (2024), the Court distinguished acts and omissions directly related to political or strategic choices from those that are not. In Neves 77 Solutions (2024), it accepted jurisdiction over the brokering prohibition at issue because it was a necessary measure that the Council was responsible for implementing through an Article 215 regulation. Neither judgment establishes unlimited jurisdiction over foreign policy (*KS and KD*, paragraphs 115-119; *Neves*, paragraphs 54-61).

Kadi

In Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission in 2008, the Court of Justice reviewed European Community measures implementing a United Nations listing against the Community legal order's constitutional guarantees. It did not review or annul the Security Council resolution itself. The judgment found defects in rights of defence and effective judicial protection and annulled the Community regulation in so far as it concerned the appellants, while temporarily maintaining effects.

In the 2013 Commission and Others v Kadi judgment, the Court of Justice addressed the later relisting and the evidentiary basis available for judicial review. The case reinforces that reasons, evidence, procedure and rights must be examined at the level of the challenged European Union act. It does not convert an administrative statement of reasons into a judicial finding of the alleged conduct.

Rosneft and statecraft relevance

In Rosneft in 2017, the Court of Justice held that it had jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the validity of specified restrictive measures within the treaty framework and found no factor affecting their validity in the questions before it. The judgment illustrates both the Common Foreign and Security Policy boundary and a route by which national proceedings can reach the Court of Justice.

Judicial review can test competence, reasons, evidence, procedure, proportionality and fundamental rights. This makes the institution a legal quality-control node in European economic statecraft. It does not make the courts the sender of a sanctions campaign, and the outcome of one proceeding cannot be generalised to every designation or sectoral measure.

As at 21 October 2026, the institutional structure, treaty provisions and judgments identified here have been checked against their official texts. The result and procedural scope of a later case must be assessed separately; this entry does not establish the validity of every current sanctions measure.

See also

Economic statecraft · Kadi v Council and Commission (ECJ, 2008) · Council of the European Union · European Commission · Proportionality and due process in targeted sanctions · European Union

Sources

  1. European Union, Treaty on European Union, Article 19, and Court of Justice of the European Union, official institutional overview and history, checked 21 October 2026.
  2. European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 263.
  3. European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 275.
  4. Court of Justice, *Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission*, joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, 3 September 2008.
  5. Court of Justice, *Commission and Others v Kadi*, joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, 18 July 2013.
  6. Court of Justice, *Rosneft*, case C-72/15, 28 March 2017.
  7. European Union, TFEU Articles 215, 256, 267, 268, 278 and 279, consolidated treaty text, OJ C 202, 7 June 2016.
  8. European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 of 11 April 2024 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, OJ L 2024/2019, 12 August 2024, Articles 1(4), 2 and 4.
  9. Court of Justice, *KS and KD v Council and Others*, joined cases C-29/22 P and C-44/22 P, 10 September 2024, paragraphs 115-119 and operative order.
  10. Court of Justice, *Neves 77 Solutions*, case C-351/22, 10 September 2024, paragraphs 54-61 and operative order.
Text integrity

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